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                                                                   ABSTRACT 
 
The recent decline of Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. raises a natural question: shouldn’t investors 
(and auditors) have been more wary of this Wall Street darling? Weren’t there tipoffs that would 
have allowed investors to avoid another franchisor  “crash and burn” situtation like Boston 
Chicken or TCBY frozen yogurt?  This paper traces the meteoric rise and fall of Krispy Kreme and 
discusses a number of advance indicators of future problems: insider share-dumping, conflicts of 
interest within the Board of Directors and senior management, turnover in the CFO position, the 
use of synthetic leases, repurchased franchises, disappointing join venture results, and the 
problems of earnings management in the quarterly reports of a fairly small publicly-owned 
business. 
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INTRODUCTION   
 
hould we be surprised when a Wall Street darling like Krispy Kreme Doughnuts crashes and burns?  
Shouldn’t there be warning signals when a company ranked as the best IPO of the 2000-02 period with a 
711% stock price runup in three years loses all of that appreciation over the next 18 months?  What causes 
a company to go from a market capitalization of just under $3 billion to little more than $300 million in such a short 
period?  
 
This paper argues that there were numerous warning signals in the doughnut franchisor’s accounting and 
managerial decisions that investors refused to take seriously as they bid the stock from its (split-adjusted) IPO price 
of $5.25 to its eventual peak of $49.50. The lessons that can be learned from an autopsy of the Krispy Kreme fiasco 
might well make investors more wary about jumping on the next IPO bandwagon. 
 
KRISPY KREME: FROM REGIONAL DELICACY TO CULTURAL PHENOMENON 
 
The Krispy Kreme story began Winston-Salem, N.C. in 1937 when Vernon Rudolph began selling 
doughnuts to grocery stores using a secret recipe from a French chef. Strong demand from customers who wanted to 
buy their doughnuts freshly made and still warm caused him to open almost 100 retail outlets throughout the South. 
After Rudolph’s death in 1973, his heirs sold the chain to Beatrice Foods, which immediately began to tinker with 
the successful recipe. By 1982 franchisees were so upset with Beatrice that they joined together to repurchase the 
chain. This created a franchisor owned and dominated by its own franchisees, which would create serious 
difficulties later on. 
 
By the mid-1990’s Krispy Kreme had escaped its Southern heritage and opened shops in the Midwest and 
Northeast, even invading Manhattan, home to many influential writers. But instead of deriding hot doughnuts as a 
provincial culinary fare like hominy or grits, the critics raved. A New York Times columnist even wrote: “When 
Krispy Kremes are hot, they are to other doughnuts what angels are to people.” The product began to appear on TV 
in sitcoms and late-night talk shows; people bragged about their attempts to “score a dozen” of the treats, and a new 
cultural phenomenon was born.   
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THE IPO: HOW TO RUIN A GOOD THING  
 
A part of the plan to escape the South and make Krispy Kreme a national brand was the decision to take the 
company public. In April 2000, $65 million was raised through the sale of 26.7% of the company’s stock, giving it a 
market capitalization of $270 million. By the end of the year, the stock price had almost quadrupled and CBS 
Marketwatch labeled Krispy Kreme the top performing IPO of the year. The company’s ability to meet or slightly 
exceed the optimistic earnings projections of market analysts combined with news stories describing hour-long lines 
outside newly-opened stores to push the stock to a split-adjusted $46 per share by the end of 2001. Investors loved 
the concept: this was a brand that seemed to combine high quality, exclusivity, and a gimmick – customers could 
actually watch their doughnuts being made. The opportunities seemed endless, as the company quickly carved up 
geographic regions for expansion and granted exclusive franchising rights, often to board members and other 
existing franchisees. 
 
When Krispy Kreme CEO Scott Livengood was named Restaurants and Institutions magazine’s Executive 
of the Year and Forbes put the firm on its list of “200 Best Small Companies,” the momentum became almost 
impossible to sustain. The stock traded at 65-100 times projected earnings, and the demand intensified to produce 
earnings gains sufficient to justify such an extreme price-earnings multiple.  
 
In May 2004 Krispy Kreme issued its first-ever profit warning, triggering a series of shareholder lawsuits 
alleging that the company had attempted to hide year-to-year declines in same-store sales. In fall of that year they 
announced their first quarterly loss since going public and attempted to blame it on a consumer trend toward low-fat 
foods. But the damage had been done: by the end of 2004 the stock price had slid from $40 to under $10 and the 
SEC had announced a formal investigation of the company’s accounting practices. 
 
In 2005 Krispy Kreme faced default on its main $150 million credit line as it was unable to produce audited 
financial statements. Scott Livengood resigned as CEO only a few months after CFO John Tate left the firm, and six 
other executives were summarily fired for undisclosed improper behavior. By the end of 2005, weekly same-store 
sales had fallen 20% from the prior year, the firm had closed 25% of its stores, and a bankruptcy filing was rumored 
to be imminent. The stock price fell back to its (split-adjusted) IPO price of $5.25 and almost $2.7 billion of 
shareholder value evaporated in a dizzying free fall. 
 
THE WARNING SIGNS 
 
While the Krispy Kreme fiasco left some investors holding the bag and frantically filing lawsuits, it should 
not have surprised more astute observers. At least a half-dozen warning signs appeared in Krispy Kreme regulatory 
filings well before the stock price started to fall: 
 
Churning In The CFO Position 
 
Continued turnover in the CFO position is often a danger signal in a fast-growing public company. Just 
after the IPO in 2000, Krispy Kreme replaced longtime Chief Financial Officer Paul Beitbach with newcomer John 
Tate. Breitbach was a traditional conservative CPA, while Tate was a more aggressive financial type who was 
forced out as CFO of Williams-Sonoma after missing two quarterly earnings forecasts. (Understandably, he made 
sure not to miss any earnings targets while at Krispy Kreme.) Tate was promoted to Chief Operating Officer in 
2002, and longtime controller Randy Casstevens was promoted to the top finance spot. Casstevens lasted less than 
eighteen months and turned in a “purely voluntary” resignation just five months before the company’s first quarterly 
earnings shortfall. To replace Casstevens, the company brought in Michael Phelan, a key member of the investment 
banking team that executed Krispy Kreme’s IPO and follow-on offering, who in turn lasted less than two years in 
the position.      
 
A later report filed with the SEC stated that Tate and Casstevens didn’t provide the “leadership or 
supervision over the accounting and finance functions that one would expect from the CFO position.” One analyst 
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suggested that “… the real numbers the CFOs were coming up with were numbers the rest of management didn’t 
want to hear. They were looking for a CFO who was going to tell them good news.” 
 
Insider Share Dumping 
 
When Krispy Kreme went public in 2000, about 75% of its shares were “locked up” – insiders who owned 
them were not permitted to sell for an eighteen-month period. As soon as the lockup period expired, executives and 
board members sold 1.85 million shares, or 20% of the shares subject to the lock-up agreement. By 2004 CEO 
Livengood had sold over 1 million shares (about 40% of his holdings) for net proceeds of over $40 million, despite 
having previously made pledges that he wouldn’t sell company stock. The high level of stock sales by insiders while 
the company was issuing glowing financial reports should have alerted shareholders to a potential problem.  
 
Synthetic Leasing 
 
Soon after it went public, Krispy Kreme arranged to finance a new $35 million factory in Effingham, 
Illinois with a synthetic bank-financed lease, which would allow them to keep a large long-term debt off their 
balance sheet and avoid raising their debt ratio from 26% to 36%. Criticism later forced them to unwind this lease 
and borrow the money to purchase this property from the bank. In the annual report, Livengood took the moral high 
ground: “In the current economic climate, investors understandably are paying closer attention to the financial 
strength of companies and the way they conduct business. We have taken the position that there is no reason for us 
to do anything that could be misinterpreted, regardless of how legal and acceptable it may be.” Wise investors 
should not have “misinterpreted” Krispy Kreme’s intention, which was clearly to avoid recording debt – at least 
until financial analysts caught on. 
 
Executive Conflict Of Interest 
 
Outside shareholders often wonder if senior management has a strong ethical or moral compass: can they 
be relied on to act responsibly as the custodians of a newly-public company? Here two situations tell a tale: 
 
(1) In early 2003 Krispy Kreme spent $39 million to acquire Montana Mills, a chain of 30 upscale “village 
bread stores” based in Rochester, N.Y. Almost $30 million of the purchase price was allocated to goodwill, 
although the concept was unproven and Montana Mills had never previously shown a profit. In what 
appears as an obvious conflict of interest, COO John Tate had served on the Montana Mills Board of 
Directors for 14 months previous to the acquisition. Not surprisingly for a non-core venture, Montana Mills 
showed a $2 million loss in the year after it was acquired, and in mid-2004 the chain was closed down, 
causing a $35 million income statement charge. 
 
(2) In its first two years as a public company, Krispy Kreme had a policy which allowed senior executives to 
make private investments in newly-established area franchisees, and Scott Livengood eventually had 
ownership stakes in seven large franchised operations. In an arrangement reminiscent of old-fashioned 
extortion operations, Livengood and other Krispy Kreme executives were allowed to “muscle in” on new 
franchise deals – they could purchase equity stakes even when the franchisee group did not want them as 
partners.  
 
After many complaints and an $8 million arbitration judgment against them over franchisee rights, this 
arrangement was terminated in 2002 as Livengood announced “The perception and confidence of our investors is 
more important to us than any business practice. I really regret the things that have put us in this position, but there’s 
been a tremendous amount of damage done to the credibility of honest people.”  
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Low Materiality Threshold In 10-Q’s 
 
As soon as an interesting young company goes public, attention begins to focus on whether they can meet 
or exceed the consensus EPS estimates of analysts. As the following table shows, for the first 14 quarters of its 
public life, Krispy Kreme did not disappoint: 
 
 
 
Quarter Ended 
 
Consensus EPS 
Estimate 
(Split-Adjusted) 
Actual EPS 
Reported 
(Split-Adjusted) 
4/30/2000 .0575 .0675 
7/31/2000 .045 .0625 
10/31/2000 .06 .0675 
1/31/2001 .065 .075 
4/30/2001 .085 .10 
7/31/2001 .09 .10 
10/31/01 .10 .11 
1/31/02 .13 .14 
4/30/02 .14 .15 
7/31/02 .14 .15 
10/31/02 .16 .17 
1/31/03 .18 .19 
4/30/03 .20 .21 
7/31/03 .20 .21 
 
 
An independent review team later confirmed that this was not an accident, as they accused management of 
having a “narrowly-focused goal of exceeding estimates by 1 cent each quarter,” and that “…the number, nature and 
timing of the accounting errors (later discovered) strongly suggest that they resulted from an intent to manage 
earnings.” 
 
What investors apparently did not realize was how little additional earnings it took to beat the estimates by 
a penny. In the first two years, a one-cent increase in quarterly EPS could be generated by only a $150,000 – 
$200,000 increase in net income, which could be (and was) achieved by asking just one franchisee to accept early 
delivery of their doughnut-making equipment. Even as late as the summer of 2003, Krispy Kreme was able to 
increase quarterly EPS by a half-cent through an interesting agreement under which it sold $700,000 of new 
equipment to a franchise which was under an existing contract for repurchase, while simultaneously agreeing to 
increase the repurchase price by $700,000 to cover the additional cost. 
 
While the ability to “beat the estimates by a penny” created a very high price-earnings ratio, it also enriched 
senior management, who had an Incentive Compensation plan worth almost $18 million annually which began to 
kick in if EPS performance exceeded estimates by 4 cents per year. Investors who were sensitive to (1) how much 
management compensation was at stake and (2) how small a profit change it took to exceed EPS projections by a 
penny would have placed significantly less importance on quarterly EPS results.   
 
Joint Venture Results 
 
As it expanded rapidly, Krispy Kreme began to finance franchisees by taking minority ownership interests 
in their stores. By the end of fiscal 2003, they had investments in 14 different area franchises with annual sales 
volume of $145 million. Since Krispy Kreme was required to use the equity method of accounting for these 
investments, their financial statements indirectly give evidence of the financial performance of a selected sample of 
their franchisees. As the following table shows, these franchisees reported losses in all but one of the 16 quarters 
between 2000 and 2003, and Krispy Kreme reported equity method losses of $5.1 million over the four year period. 
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QUARTER 
EQUITY-METHOD PROFIT/(LOSS) 
REPORTED BY KRISPY KREME 
Q1 2000 $(245,000) 
Q2 2000 (355,000) 
Q3 2000 (64,000) 
Q4 2000 (42,000) 
Q1 2001 (171,000) 
Q2 2001 (33,000) 
Q3 2001 (8,000) 
Q4 2001 (390,000) 
Q1 2002 (198,000) 
Q2 2002 18,000 
Q3 2002 (639,000) 
Q4 2002 (1,189,000) 
Q1 2003 (694,000) 
Q2 2003 (802,000) 
Q3 2003 (33,000) 
Q4 2003 (301,000) 
 
 
While these were “paper” losses and had no direct effect on the financial stability of Krispy Kreme, they 
did provide evidence of a serious problem – in spite of the favorable publicity and long lines outside newly-opened 
outlets, a lot of the company’s franchisees were not making any money. 
 
Repurchase Of Franchise Rights 
 
While it is not unusual for franchisors to occasionally repurchase franchises from disgruntled or 
underperforming franchisees, few attempt it on such a large scale. From the second quarter of 2001 through the end 
of fiscal 2003 (February 2, 2004), the company spent about $210 million in cash and stock to buy out the stores and 
future franchising rights of a number of area franchise developers. Critics found a number of troublesome issues 
here: 
 
 Why would so many large franchisees of a supposedly-successful chain want to get out of their investment 
when operations seemed to be going so well? 
 The largest single franchise buyout ($67 million) was owned by two present and past Krispy Kreme Board 
members. Analysts following the company immediately suspected a “sweetheart” deal for former corporate 
insiders. 
 The price paid for most of the buyouts seemed outlandish, reaching a peak of $11.2 million per store at a 
time when a new franchise could be set up an equipped for about $1.5 million. 
 About 85% of the purchase price for franchises ($175 million) was allocated to “repurchased franchise 
rights,”- the right to build new outlets within a given territory-  yet by this time the company was 
discovering that further expansion to smaller and less desirable locations within existing franchise areas 
was usually not profitable. 
 Once acquired, these franchise rights were treated as an intangible asset not subject to amortization, which 
was contrary to the established practice of other franchisors who had made similar repurchases. Amortizing 
these rights over a 10-year period would have cut the company’s reported fiscal 2003 profit by 30%. 
 They bought out a struggling Michigan franchisee and agreed to raise the purchase price from $26 million 
to $32 million so that the franchisee could afford to close two stores and to settle its overdue debts owed to 
Krispy Kreme, thus avoiding a bad debt loss.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the Krispy Kreme stock price run-up of 2000-03, a series of early warning signs appeared, but 
investors seemed to ignore them. While each of these signs individually do not presage a coming disaster, when 
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taken as a whole they should have served as a warning to investors. Publicly-available documents show extensive 
insider share-selling, significant conflicts of interest among senior managers and the Board of Directors, an unwise 
investment in a non-core business, high turnover in the CFO position, a willingness to buy out the franchise rights of 
insiders at premium prices, a history of operating losses at the franchisee level, a willingness to use accounting 
games to avoid putting debt on the balance sheet, and a disturbingly consistent trend of beating quarterly EPS targets 
by just enough to earn significant bonuses for executives. Wise investors should not have been surprised when the 
stock price began to fall precipitously in 2004 and the company (followed quickly by the SEC) began an 
investigation into its management decision-making and accounting practices.  
 
 
NOTES 
